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1 Problem Definition
1.1 R7 - Model Development for Risks posed by COVID-19 on U.S. Trade
Supply Chain Infrastructure
Important to the mission of the of the Center of Excellence for Cross-Border Threat Screening
and Supply Chain Defense (CBTS) is the provision of research and development support to
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), particularly for supply chain defense through
early detection of and mitigation of bio-threats that may enter the country, and to assess and
manage risks these may cause to society, the economy and the environment. This is the case
of COVID-19, a novel coronavirus first detected in China and declared a “pandemic” by
the World Health Organization (WHO) in March of 2020. Since its detection, COVID-19
has generated a growing and significant amount of evidence, some of which is of critical
relevance for the DHS’ Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD).
1.2 R13 - U.S. - Mexico Risk Taskforce to Support the Health Supply Chain
Systems for Infrastructure and Workforce Threatened by the COVID-19
Pandemic
There are significant concerns in the U.S. and in Mexico to open the regional economies
under the current to long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 22 of 2020, the
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) sent a letter signed by 327 CEO’s to Mexico’s
President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador “asking that his government refer to the guidance
issued by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to determine whether a particular
factory be designated as essential and critical”. On April 29 of 2020, 11 Senators sent a letter
to Secretary of State Pompeo “to urge the State Department to coordinate with the Mexican
government to clarify Mexico’s definition of essential businesses to avoid disruptions in the
U.S. supply chain”. These two communications from the U.S. to Mexico are a reflection of
recent changes on the nominal GDP growth in both the U.S. and Mexico.
The recent signing of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA) late in 2018
envisioned a basis to renew trade efforts between the regional economies by strengthening
provisions on intellectual property, shipment value (de Minimis), financial services, currency,
labor, and the environment. On April 24, 2020 the Trump administration notified Congress
that the USMCA would take effect on July 1, 2020. It is worth noticing that no major public
health provision was included that could anticipate the social, economic and environmental
impacts currently posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. This has revealed significant stress and
a number of vulnerabilities across all supply chain systems, threatening with the potential
of collapse or a partial breakdown that could lead to an increase of social, economic and
environmental risks. It is therefore hypothesized that from all supply chains, the ones that
are of critical relevance to mitigate these potential risks are the ones supporting the regional
health infrastructure and the health of the workforce.
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In addition, since Dr. Medina-Cetina joined TAMU, he has developed a record of
successful bi-national research, teaching, and service collaborations between U.S. & Mexico.
This includes the Yucatan Initiative Project (https://yucatan-initiative.tamu.edu/),
a multi-year sponsored project by the Government of Yucatan in Mexico, aimed at creating
a set of multidisciplinary research, teaching and service projects, thought to support the
regional economies of the States of Texas and Yucatan; and the Network to Network for
the Gulf of Mexico project (http://n2ngom.net/) sponsored by the National Science
Foundation (NSF) and co-sponsored by a group of industrial and government partners,
aimed at integrating a binational coordinating organization tasked with the development and
sponsorship of the decadal research agenda for the Gulf of Mexico, across more than 250
networks representing all economic sectors.
2 Objectives
• To formulate a comprehensive risk assessment model, identifying qualitatively the rel-
evant variables and processes needed to assess the social, economic and environmental
impacts posed by COVID-19 and other converging threats on the U.S. trade supply
chain infrastructure, but also on the health of community, health of the workforce, and
on the heatlhcare systems.
• To generate risk-mitigating strategies based on the associate risk assessment model, to
address causes and effects posed by COVID19 on the vulnerable systems identified.
3 Hypothesis
• A Risk framework will be used to populate a Bayesian network model depicting quali-
tatively and using simple cause-effect graphical relations, highly complex interactions
between processes changing in space and time. The identification of these processes
and cause-effect relationships is needed for the assessment of the social, environmental,
and economic states of risk posed by COVID-19.
• The formulated model will allow the identification and characterization of strategic
evidence, to reveal the true impact of a complex spread of an infectious disease such
as the COVID19 pandemic.
• By setting criteria to identify and characterize strategic components of risk assessment
and management (threats, vulnerable systems, impacts, states of risk, mitigating
actions), sources of evidence will be identified, alongside gaps or missing evidence
that needs to be collected to produce a quantitative Risk Assessment.
• The resulting effort will improve the decision-making process for supply chains
impacted by COVID-19, and other converging threats.
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4 Methodology
4.1 Risk Assessment Framework
The framework is generally defined as:
Risk = [Hazard]∗ [Vulnerability]∗ [Consequence] (1)
where:
• Hazard is the likelihood of occurrence of converging Threats (e.g., processes describ-
ing potential viral entries and transmission to humans, climate patterns exacerbating
or reducing its life-cycle, processes describing geopolitical events or government-
mandated changes due to the virus).
• Vulnerability is the likelihood of reaching an Impact in the vulnerable System, con-
ditioned on a given Threat intensity (e.g. processes describing how trade dependent
supply chain systems may react to converging threats associated to the virus, as these
apply across land points of entry, air and seaports and across multiple countries).
• Consequence represents the value of the elements exposed to converging threats, and
its characterized by the social, environmental, or economic Impacts on the vulnerable
Systems (e.g. processes describing population mobility patterns as they may be exposed
to the virus, type of port and/or associated personnel most likely to be affected, financial
markets and economic sectors affected by the spread of the virus).
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Figure 1: Risk assessment framework
4.2 Risk Assessment & Management Framework
The Risk Assessment Framework is expanded into the following form to represent Risk
Assessment & Management:
R = [H ∗V ∗C]+ [Cost(AC+PC)−AC−PC] (2)
Where:
AC = Active Countermeasures
PC=Passive Countermeasures
In order to reduce the state of risk, mitigation actions such as active countermeasures
(AC) and passive countermeasures (PC) can be applied. An AC has an impact on hazard
reduction, and a PC has an impact on the vulnerability and/or consequence reduction. The
implementation of either one of these generates costs. Therefore, the trade-off between the
savings induced by the hazard or vulnerability and/or consequences reduction, and the costs
associated with their implementation is what defines the risk measure.
Figure 2: Risk assessment & management framework
4.3 Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian Network (BN) is a graphical representation of the joint probability distribution
of a set of random variables, and is a combination of a graphical and a probabilistic model.
Nodes and arcs compose a BN, where the nodes represent the random variables in the model,
while the arcs illustrate the conditional probability relationships between variables [1]. A
node is referred to as a parent node if it has one or more arcs directed to another node, called
the child node.
Bayes theorem represents a probabilistic inference between a hypothesis (A) and the
evidence (B) to assess the posterior conditional probability P(A|B). This relationship is
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interpreted as a causal dependency between ‘parent’ and ‘child’ nodes, represented with
a Conditional Probability Table (CPT), which transmits the message through the network
arcs [2]. When the probability is propagated from parent to child node (i.e. cause to effect)
a prognostic analysis is performed. In contrast, a diagnostic analysis happens when the
probability is propagated from child to parent nodes (i.e. effect to cause).
Figure 3 shows an example of a BN with three independent parent variables (V 1,V 2,V 3)
and one child node (V 4), for a total of m=4 nodes, with each variable discretized in n = 3
states. Equation 3 describes the message propagation in prognosis (π(Z)), which produces a
list with all the possible combinations of three discrete states of four variables (mn = 81).
The diagnosis message (λ (Z)) is propagated from the child node to the parent nodes and is
computed through Equation 4. In this case, the child node is instantiated with a prescribed
distribution in order to infer the marginal probabilities of the parent nodes.
Figure 3: Example of a Bayesian Network
P(Childi) = ∑
27













j:{1, 2, ... , 27} list of combinations where the Child node is low, moderate or high
k:{1,2,3} parent node index
l: {1,2,...,81} list of combinations for three classes of four nodes
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4.4 Risk Assessment & Management Framework in Bayesian Networks
To illustrate the definition of Risk, the Figure 4 shows a synthetic case of social Risk
Assessment with one Threat, one Vulnerability, and one Consequence.
Figure 4: BN Synthetic Case 1
In this case, the hazard is the total number of COVID-19 cases, and P(CC) is the marginal
distribution, depicting the probability of the threat intensity to be in one of the three possible
states (i.e. low, moderate, high). P(HI|CC) is an assessment of the vulnerability, given the
intensity of the threat. In the synthetic case, it represents a reduction in the capacity of
health infrastructure, given the number of COVID-19 cases. The utility function U(C) is
evaluating the impact of the Consequences (C) as a number of deaths. The implementation
of U(C) translates the probability of the node HI to a number of deaths through the following
expression:
U(C) = c1P(HIHigh)∗ c2P(HIMod)∗ c3P(HILow) (5)
This way, the equation for Risk presented previously:
Risk = [Hazard]∗ [Vulnerability]∗ [Consequences] (6)
becomes:
Risk = P(CC)∗P(HI|CC)∗U(C) (7)
Thus, it is illustrated how the Bayesian Network conforms to the definition of Risk, as
shown by [3]. In Figure 4, the first table (from left to right) corresponds to the marginal
probability distribution for the threat, while the second one is a conditional probability table
that shows the probability of the variable HI to be in a Low, Mod, or High state, given the
state of the variable CC.
This framework can be expanded to include multiple Threats, multiple Vulnerabilities,
and multiple Consequences, as presented in Figure 5. This synthetic case includes two
different threats in COVID-19 cases and Geopolitics, two vulnerable systems in Health
Infrastructure and Economy, and two set of consequences: social (deaths), and economic (un-
employment). The Bayesian Network shown in Figure 5 can be formulated as the expression
of Risk in Equations 6, and 7.
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Figure 5: BN Synthetic Case 2
5 Model Development
5.1 Risk Assessment Model
Steps followed for model development:
• Identify Threats, Vulnerable Systems, and Impact Metrics
• Identify variables and processes defining the Threats, Vulnerable Systems, and Impact
Metrics
• Identify dependencies between variables/processes within Threats, Vulnerable Systems,
and Impact Metrics
• Identify dependencies between Threats, Vulnerable Systems, and Impact Metrics
Figure 6 shows the Risk Assessment Model developed following the previous steps
and performing an extensive literature review. Figure 7 presents the minimum conceptual
model that corresponds to the smallest group of variables representing all the cause-effect
relationships between variables and processes. As such, the minimum conceptual model
includes the main groups of variables that represent the threats, the vulnerable systems, and
the states of risk. Figures 6, and 7 present the model for one location, this is, where all the
entities of the supply chain are located in the same geographic region.
In order to extend the model to multiple geographies, Figure 8 and 9 show the minimum
conceptual and complete model for different locations, respectively. High resolution images
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Figure 6: Complete Risk Assessment model - One location, see the appendix A.1 for a higher
resolution version
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Figure 7: Minimum Conceptual Risk Assessment model - One location, see the appendix
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Figure 9: Complete Risk Assessment model - Multiple locations, see the appendix A.1 for a higher resolution version
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Section 5.2 describes the structure of the Risk Assessment model by risk components,
(Threats, Vulnerable Systems, Impacts, States of Risk), groups, and subgroups with the
complete list of variables in each one. Definitions for the variables can be found in section
5.3.
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Soil/Ground Drought [4], [21]
5.2.1.2 Anthropogenic
Table 2: Anthropogenic Threats group
Subgroup Variables References
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SARS-CoV-2 Mutation in Human Host
Direct Contact: Airborne
Direct Contact: Respiratory Droplets
Indirect Contact: Contaminated Surfaces
(Indoor)






















5.2.1.3 Zoonotic Diseases Spillover
Table 3: Zoonotic Diseases Spillover Threats group
Subgroup Variables References
Human Infection Emerging Zoonotic Disease Spillover
Probability of Human Infection
Structural Barriers




Human Exposure dose due to Excretion
Human Interaction with Reservoir Host
Probability that Pathogen from Excretion Disperses
Duration of Pathogen Survival from Excretion
Reservoir Host Excretion Rate
Reservoir Excretion Intensity of Infection
Prevalence of Infection Among Reservoir Host (Animals)







Human Exposure Dose due to Infected Meat
Dose Exposure Associated to Harvesting Activity
Dose Exposure Associated to Butchering and Preparation
Dose Exposure Associated to Eating
Duration of Pathogen Survival from Meat Harvested
Probability that the Meat Harvested will be Transported and
Prepared or Consumed








Human Exposure Dose due to Infected Vector
Per-vector Rate of Biting Humans
Dose to which a Human is Exposed when Bitten by
Infectious Vector
Duration of Pathogen Survival from Vector




Total Rate at which Uninfected Vectors Bite Reservoir Host
















































5.2.2.2 Health System Services
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5.2.2.3 Supply Chain
Table 6: Supply Chain group
Subgroup Variables References
Vendor/Supplier Geographical Location (V)
Labor Shortage (Supplier)





IT & Cyber Compliance (V)
Vendor Computer Information System
Scheduling Production (V)
Demand Planning (V)
Inventory Carrying Cost Rate (V)
Inventory Carrying Cost (V)
Vendor Delay
Vendor Capacity
Action Trigger (V) (Reputation)







Continued on next page
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Table 6 Supply Chain group (continued)
Subgroup Variables References







Value of Product (M)





IT & Cyber Compliance (M)
Manufacturer Computer Information System
Scheduling Production (M)
Demand Planning
Inventory Carrying Cost (M)
Inventory Carrying Cost Rate (M)
Action Trigger (M) (Reputation)








Continued on next page
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Table 6 Supply Chain group (continued)
Subgroup Variables References







Type of Product (R)





IT & Cyber Compliance (R)
Retailer Computer Information System
Demand Planning
Inventory Carrying Cost Rate
Inventory Carrying Cost
Retailer Delay
Action Trigger (R) (Reputation)















Continued on next page
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Table 6 Supply Chain group (continued)
Subgroup Variables References
Logistics Operator Logistics Personnel Shortage
Transportation Restrictions/Disruptions
Transportation Mode
IT & Cyber Compliance





Transport Greenhouse Gases Emissions
Mode Reliability








Table 7: Environmental Consequences
Subgroup Variables References




























5.2.4 States of Risk
5.2.4.1 Social
Table 9: Social States of Risk
Subgroup Variables References












Table 10: Environmental States of Risk
Subgroup Variables References
































Volcanic Activity: the likelihood of volcanic activity events such as emission of gases,
non-explosive lava emissions to extremely violent explosive bursts [116].
Seismic Activity: measures earthquake likelihood, mechanisms, and magnitude for a
given geographical location [117].
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Elevation/Bathymetry: Elevation is the distance above sea level for a given location.
Bathymetry is the ocean’s depth below sea level for a given location [118].
Snow Avalanche: the likelihood of rapid flow of snow mass and ice on slopes, which can
contain soils, rocks, and vegetation [119]. Snow avalanches are classified according to their
destructive potential, mass, path length, and impact pressure [120].
Rockfall: the likelihood of a mass of rock from a bedrock on a steep slope is detached
with a small or no shear displacement [121]. Rockfalls are characterized by slope height,
geologic character, volume, climate, presence of water on slope, and rockfall history [122].
Debris Flow: the likelihood of a gravity-driven movement of sediments containing water
as a mixture that flows fast or extremely fast [123]. Debris flow size can be classified based
on total volume, peak discharge, and area inundated by debris [124].
Earth slide: the likelihood of a downslope movement of a soil mass that occurs on
a surface of rupture or on a relatively thin zone of intense shear strain. [125]. Slides are
characterized by material, mechanism, mass, and velocity among other parameters [126, 127].
Atmospheric
Pressure Distribution: distribution of atmospheric pressure that varies in terms of geo-
graphical location and season.
Humidity: amount of water vapor contained in the air that can be measured as vapor
pressure, mixing ratio, or specific humidity [128].
Wind: it refers to wind velocity. Wind speeds can be classified by using the Beaufort
Wind Scale [129].
Lightning: only cloud to ground lightning discharge is considered in this variable. The
intensity of the discharge can be characterized by electric current, current duration, and
voltage [130].
Cloud Cover: "total area of the sky nearest to the earth that is covered with clouds" [131].
Cloud cover can be measured in terms of "Okta" or one-eighth of the sky [131].
Sunlight: amount of sunlight reaching Earth’s surface that is measured in units of watts
per square meter [132].
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Snowfall: accumulation of snow that is often measured by visibility, and by measuring
liquid equivalent snowfall rate [133].
Surface Air Temperature: temperature measured at a standard height of 1.5 or 2 meters
above the surface [134].
Surface Energy Balance: "sum of all fluxes of energy passing each second through a
horizontal surface of unit area" [135]. Measured in Joules per second per square meter, or
watts per square meter.
Rainfall: the intensity of rainfall is characterized by the average rainfall for a specific
duration and frequency [136].
Greenhouse Gas Concentration: includes carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and
halogenated gases (chlorine, fluorine, or bromine). Concentrations of these gases are mea-
sured in parts per million (ppm), parts per billion (ppb), or parts per trillion (ppt) by volume
[137].
Hurricane: "a rotating low-pressure weather system that has organized thunderstorms
but no fronts (a boundary separating two air masses of different densities)" [138]. Hurricanes
are classified based on their wind speed as suggested in the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind
Scale [139].
Vertical Wind Shear: change of winds’ direction and velocity at increasing heights in the
atmosphere [140].
Convective Available Potential Energy: "it describes the instabilily of the atmosphere
and provides an approximation of updraft strength within a thunderstorm" [141]. CAPE is
expressed in joules per kilogram and can range from zero to over 5000.
Tornado: "a violently rotating column of air touching the ground, usually attached to the
base of a thunderstorm" [142]. Tornadoes are classified as "weak", "strong", or "violent"
based on their estimated wind speeds and resultant damage according to the National Weather
Service [142].
Oceanographic
Sea Level: refers to "Relative Sea Level", which is the height of the ocean with respect to
land along a coastline for a given region or location [143].
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Sea Surface Temperature: water temperature measurements taken at depths that range
from 1 millimeter to 20 meters [144].
Surge: also known as "storm surge", which is the result of increased sea level due to a
tropical or extratropical cyclone impacting a coast. Storm surge height depends on storm’s
forward speed, central pressure, angle of approach (relative to the coast), and the local
topography and bathymetry [145].
Hydrological
Coastal Flooding: inundation of land areas along a coast as a consequence of sea level
rise [146].
Inland Flooding: inundation of land as a consequence of moderate or intense rainfall
over short or long periods respectively. [146].
Water Quality: "measure of the suitability of water for a particular use based on selected
physical, chemical, and biological characteristics" [147].
Biological
Insect Outbreak: the likelihood of "an explosive increase in the abundance of a particular
specie of insects that occurs over a relatively short period of time" [148].
Vector Density: degree of concentration of vector population per area at a given time
[19].
Stray and Feral Pet Population: domestic and non-domestic dogs and cats population for
a specific location or region at a given time [52].
Reservoir Host Density (Animals): degree of concentration of infected animals from a
pathogen per area at a given time [19].
Air Quality: the degree at which ambient air for a given location and time is pollution-free.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a national air quality index since 1976
that provides a daily air quality report by state [149].
Fauna Migration: the likelihood of movement of individual or group of animals as a
consequence of a natural or anthropogenic threat [4].
Page 31
Fire Regime: "the spatial and temporal pattern of fires and their effects in a given area
and over a given time period" [150].
Soil/Ground
Drought: drought indices are employed to quantify meteorological, agricultural and
hydrological droughts such as Rainfall Anomaly Index (RAI), Palmer Drought Severity
Index (PDSI), Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI), Reconnaissance Drought Index (RDI),
Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI), Crop Moisture Index (CMI),
Soil Moisture Drought Index (SMDI), and Standardized Runoff Index (SRI) [151].
5.3.1.2 Anthropogenic
Land use/Land cover
Land Cover: it measures how much area of a region is covered by forests, wetlands,
impervious surfaces, agriculture, and other land and water types [152].
Land/Wildlife Management: this variable represents the availability of governmental
programs to preserve and improve habitats for a given location and time [152].
Governance and politics
Governance and Cultural Values: it represents the likelihood of how governance and
cultural values can influence other anthropogenic processes such as corruption and political
stability [4].
Political Stability: probability that a political system can cope a threat or a combination
of threats in a given location and time [153].
Corruption: the likelihood of presence of corruption in a supply chain system [28].
Economic Activities
Child Labour: the likelihood of presence of child labour practices in a supply chain
system [29].
Tourism: the likelihood of how tourism has an effect on the eating habits of a given
region. Exotic eating habits can enable the emerge of parasites in food [52].
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Herding: the likelihood of herding practices in a given time and location [52].
Hunting: the likelihood of hunting practices in a given time and location [52].
Occupations: the likelihood of diversity in terms of jobs and economic occupations for a
given region. [52].
Population
Poverty: it is defined by a set of money income thresholds that vary by country, family
size, and composition to determine the degree of poverty [154, 155].
Regional/Local Population: the degree of overpopulation for a given location and time
[32].
Population Change: the degree of difference in size of population between two periods
of time (e.g. monthly, yearly, etc.) [32].
Population Density: human population per unit area for a given location and time. [32].
Cultural Diversity: the likelihood of how cultural diversity has an effect on the eating
habits of a given region. Exotic eating habits can enable the emerge of parasites in food [52].
Education & Knowledge
Scientific Knowledge: this variable aims to represent the degree of production of knowl-
edge for a specific country or region at a given time. This can be measured by using qualitative
and quantitative indexes such as the h-index, g-index, impact factor, etc. [156].
Traditional Indigenous Knowledge: "a network of knowledges, beliefs, and traditions
intended to preserve, communicate, and contextualize Indigenous relationships with culture
and landscape over time" [157].
Access to Education: the degree at which a population have access to formal education at
a given location and time. This might be measured using proxies such as number of school
institutions, teachers, students, etc. [158].
Education Level: this variable measures the distribution of the highest levels of education
achieved in a community. The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)
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suggest 8 levels of education based on the complexity of educational content [159].
Misinformation: the degree of "information that is false or inaccurate, and not supported
by scientific evidence" [33] that is produced in a given region and time.
Discrimination: the degree of racial discrimination activities or events for a given location
and time [34].
Crime & Terrorism
Terrorism: the likelihood of terrorism activities defined as "the use of force or violence
against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the United States for purposes
of intimidation, coercion, or ransom" [37].
Crime & Violence: this variable can be characterized by country or regional level indica-
tors such as rates of violent crime, incarceration, homicide, etc. [38].
Cyber Threats
Piracy: the likelihood of misuse of data outside the principal purpose of releasing data
by the owner [42].
Cyber Attack: likelihood of an attack to IT infrastructure with the intention of corrupting
or damaging data/information [43].
Information Theft: the likelihood of loss of control over sensitive information [42].
IT Failure: likelihood of a failure in the normal operation of IT networks, leading to
unavailability of critical services [42].
Ecosystem Services
Water Security: the degree of how reliable is the access to "affordable and safe drinking
water in adequate supply for basic needs" [44].
Water Supply: the degree of how reliable is the access to affordable and clean water to
satisfy the needs of both health-care system and supply chain system [44].
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Power Supply: it refers to the degree of supply of electric power for both health-care and
supply chain systems [73].
Resource Extraction: refers to activities involved in the withdrawal of raw materials from
the environment, for further processing to add value. Extraction practices my or may not be
sustainable, given their impact on the natural environment [45, 46]
Community Disposal Practices: it captures if garbage disposal practices are enforced or
not in a community [52].
Human-Human COVID-19 Transmission
Infected Human Cases (SARS-CoV-2: number of infected human cases by SARS-CoV-2
for a given location and time [55].
COVID-19 Community Spread: the degree and likelihood of COVID-19 spread in a
community for a given time [55].
Superspreader Events: refers to events where a large number of secondary cases relative
to the standard reproductive rate, R0, are initiated, thus acting as a catalyst for outbreaks.
They can be classified as ’societal’ or isolated’ [160].
The following variables of the model are included as parent nodes for Superspreader
Events. In the context of the model, they refer to the likelihood of a given event, situation, or
activities in a mentioned location, to become a superspreader event [160]:
• Migrant Caravan














Community Demographics: involves demographic characteristics such as income inequal-
ity, unemployment, health insurance, gender, and race. These characteristics are related to
the rates of COVID-19 spread [161].
SARS-CoV-2 Mutation in Human Host: the likelihood of a new SARS-CoV-2 mutation
in human hosts, and its infectivity intensity [162].
Direct Contact: Airborne: the likelihood of having a direct contact with SARS-CoV-2
via airborne for a given location and time [54].
Direct Contact: Respiratory Droplets: the likelihood of having a direct contact with
SARS-CoV-2 via respiratory droplets for a given location and time [54].
Indirect Contact: Contaminated Surfaces (Indoor): the likelihood of having an indirect
contact with SARS-CoV-2 via contaminated surfaces in an indoor location at a given time
[53].
Indirect Contact: Contaminated Surfaces (Outdoor): the likelihood of having an indirect
contact with SARS-CoV-2 via contaminated surfaces in an outdoor location at a given time
[53].
Proximity (H-H): the likelihood and intensity of concentration of people for a given
location and time. Mobility data from mobile devices, social media, and commercial air travel
are useful to characterize this variable, and its effect on COVID-9 spread in a community
[163].
5.3.1.3 Zoonotic Diseases Spillover
Human Infection
Emerging Zoonotic Disease Spillover: likelihood and intensity of a zoonotic disease
spillover in a community at a given time [19].
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Probability of Human Infection: probability of a human to be infected from a zoonotic
disease [19].
Structural Barriers: physical barriers such as "skin, mucous membranes, mucus, stomach
acid or the absence of functional receptors that enable the pathogen to enter its target cells or
tissues" [19].
Innate Immune Response & Molecular Compatibility: protective mechanisms that include
apoptosis or the induction of interferon-induced resistance in surrounding cells [19].
Human exposure due to excretion
Human Exposure dose due to Excretion: the likelihood and intensity of the exposure
dose due to animal excretion for a given location and time [19].
Human Interaction with Reservoir Host: the likelihood of a human of being in contact
with a pathogen reservoir host at a given location and time [52].
Probability that Pathogen from Excretion Disperses: the likelihood that excretions from
infected animals disperse at a given location and time [19].
Duration of Pathogen Survival from Excretion: it measures how much time the pathogen
from excretion survives [19].
Reservoir Host Excretion Rate: "rate at which pathogen is shed from a reservoir host" at
a given location and time. [19].
Reservoir Excretion Intensity of Infection: the average intensity of infection from a
reservoir host excretion [19].
Prevalence of Infection Among Reservoir Host (Animals): the likelihood of prevalence of
infection among reservoir hosts at a given location and time [19].
Average Intensity of Infection on an Infected Reservoir Host: in average, the pathogen
intensity of infection on infected animals at a given location and time [19].
Human exposure due to infected meat
Human Exposure Dose due to Infected Meat: the likelihood and intensity of the exposure
dose due to infected meat for a given location and time [19].
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Dose Exposure Associated to Harvesting Activity: the dose related to humans that are
exposed to a pathogen infection due to harvesting of infected animals [19].
Dose Exposure Associated to Butchering and Preparation: the dose related to humans
that are exposed to a pathogen infection due to butchering and preparation of infected meat
[19].
Dose Exposure Associated to Eating: the dose related to humans that are exposed to a
pathogen infection due to eating infected meat [19].
Duration of Pathogen Survival from Meat Harvested: it measures how much time the
pathogen from infected meat survives [19].
Probability that the Meat Harvested will be Transported and Prepared or Consumed:
the likelihood of infected meat will be transported, prepared or consumed at a given location
and time [19].
Reservoir Host Harvest Rate: "rate at which reservoir hosts are harvested" at a given
location and time [19].
Human exposure due to infected vector
Human Exposure Dose due to Infected Vector: the likelihood and intensity of the expo-
sure dose due to infected vector for a given location and time [19].
Per-vector Rate of Biting Humans: total rate at which infected vectors bite humans at a
given location and time [19].
Dose to which a Human is Exposed when Bitten by Infectious Vector: the dose related to
humans that are exposed to a pathogen infection when bitten by infectious vector [19].
Duration of Pathogen Survival from Vector: it measures how much time the pathogen
from an infected vector survives [19].
Probability that Pathogen from Infected Vector Disperses: the likelihood of pathogen
dispersion from infected vectors at a given location and time [19].
Latent Period: "the period of time between the occurrence of infection and the onset of
infectiousness (when the infected individual becomes infectious)" [164].
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Infectious Period: the time interval during which a host is capable to transmit a pathogen
directly or indirectly to another susceptible host [165].
Vector Competence: probability that an infected vector transmits a pathogen to humans
[166].
Total Rate at which Uninfected Vectors Bite Reservoir Host: rate at which uninfected
vectors bite reservoir hosts at a given location and time [19].
Probability that Vector becomes Infected: the likelihood of a vector to become infected




Chronic Diseases: group of "conditions that last 1 year or more and require ongoing
medical attention or limit activities of daily living or both" [167]. The model includes the
following conditions: asthma, chronic renal failure, COPD, diabetes, hypertension, and
obesity. The Chronic Diseases variable represents the likelihood and distribution of chronic
conditions for a given population and time.
Cerebrovascular Diseases: "group of conditions that affect blood flow and the blood ves-
sels in the brain" [168]. The model includes the following conditions: diabetes, hypertension,
obesity, and smoking. The Cerebrovascular Diseases variable represents the likelihood and
distribution of cerebrovascular conditions for a given population and time.
Immunosuppression: "decreased capacity to neutralize external organisms, which may
result in repeated, more severe, or prolonged infections, as well as an increased susceptibility
to cancer development" [169]. This variable represents the likelihood and distribution of
immunosuppression conditions for a given population and time.
Cancer: the likelihood and distribution of cancer disease for a given population and time
[170].
Chronic Liver Diseases: "gradual destruction of liver tissue over time" such as cirrhosis
and Fibrosis of the liver diseases [171]. This variable represents the likelihood and distribu-
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tion of chronic liver diseases for a given population and time.
Congenital Heart Disease: the likelihood and distribution of congenital heart defects for
a given population and time [170].
Genetic Disorders: "disease caused in whole or in part by a change in the DNA sequence
away from the normal sequence" [172].This variable represents the likelihood and distribu-
tion of genetic disorders for a given population and time.
Inherited Metabolic Disorders: the likelihood and distribution of inherited metabolic
disorders for a given population and time [170].
Smoking: the likelihood and distribution of current or former cigarette smokers for a
given population and time [170].
Chronic Renal Failure: the likelihood and distribution of chronic renal failure diseases
for a given population and time [170].
COPD: the likelihood and distribution of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD)
for a given population and time. It includes emphysema and chronic bronchitis. [170].
Asthma: the likelihood and distribution of asthmatic people for a given population and
time [170].
Obesity: the likelihood and distribution of obese people for a given population and time
[170].
Diabetes: the likelihood and distribution of diabetic people for a given population and
time [170].
Hypertension: the likelihood and distribution of hypertension cases for a given population
and time [170].
Hemoglobin Disorders: the likelihood and distribution of hemoglobin disorders for a
given population and time. It includes sickle cell disease (SCD) and thalassemia. [170].
Neurological Conditions: the likelihood and distribution of neurological conditions such
as dementia for a given population and time. [170].
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Demographics
Ethnicity: the likelihood and distribution of race for a given population and time. [64].
Gender: the likelihood and distribution of sex for a given population and time. [64].
Age: the likelihood and distribution of age for a given population and time. [64].
Pregnant: the likelihood and distribution of pregnant people for a given population and
time. [170].
Health of the Workforce (Supply Chain):
Ethnicity: the likelihood and distribution of workforce’s race from a supply chain system
for a given population and time. [64].
Gender: the likelihood and distribution of workforce’s sex from a supply chain system
for a given population and time. [64].
Age: the likelihood and distribution of workforce’s age from a supply chain system for a
given population and time. [64].
Proximity at Workplace: the likelihood and intensity of concentration of people for a
given supply chain workplace and time. Mobility data from mobile devices and social media
are useful to characterize this variable, and its effect on COVID-9 spread at the workplace
[163].
Absenteeism: the likelihood and intensity of number of absent workers due to health
related issues [65].
Health of the workforce (Healthcare):
Ethnicity: the likelihood and distribution of workforce’s race from a healthcare system
for a given population and time. [64].
Gender: the likelihood and distribution of workforce’s sex from a healthcare system for
a given population and time. [64].
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Age: the likelihood and distribution of workforce’s age from a healthcare system for a
given population and time. [64].
Proximity at Workplace: the likelihood and intensity of concentration of people for a
given healthcare workplace and time. Mobility data from mobile devices and social media
are useful to characterize this variable, and its effect on COVID-9 spread at the workplace
[163].
5.3.2.2 Health System Services
Critical support systems
Transportation: the availability of emergency medical transportation such as ambulances
in a given location and time [73].
Demand for Health Services: the likelihood and intensity of demand for critical support
systems to provide healthcare services [72].
Human resources
Doctors: the availability of medical doctors to provide healthcare services in a given
location and time [72].
Nurses/Midwives: the availability of nurses and midwives to provide healthcare services
in a given location and time [71].
Graduates of Health Training Institutions: the availability of graduates from health
training institutions to provide healthcare services in a given location and time.
Non-medical Staff : the availability of non-medical staff such as pharmacists, social
workers, general staff, etc. for a given location and time [72].
Volunteerism: the availability of medical volunteers to provide healthcare services for a
given location and time [72]
Access (Waiting Time): the degree and likelihood of time to wait for accessing to health-
care services provided by medical staff in a healthcare facility or system in a given location
and time [173].
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Demand for Health Services: the likelihood and intensity of demand for human resources
to provide healthcare services [72].
Equipment
Infusion Devices: the availability of infusion devices to provide healthcare services in a
healthcare facility or system in a given location and time [72].
Mechanical Ventilators: the availability of mechanical ventilators to provide healthcare
services in a healthcare facility or system in a given location and time [72].
Monitors: the availability of monitors to provide healthcare services in a healthcare
facility or system in a given location and time [72].
Demand for Health Services: the likelihood and intensity of demand for medical equip-
ment to provide healthcare services [72].
Pharmaceuticals
Antimicrobial Therapy: the availability of antimicrobial therapy to provide healthcare
services in a healthcare facility or system in a given location and time [72].
Antiviral: the availability of antiviral to provide healthcare services in a healthcare facility
or system in a given location and time [65].
Prophylactic Treatment: the availability of prophylactic treatment to provide healthcare
services in a healthcare facility or system in a given location and time [72].
Demand for Health Services: the likelihood and intensity of demand for pharmaceuticals
to provide healthcare services [72].
Supplies
Hemodynamic Support: the availability of hemodynamic support to provide healthcare
services in a healthcare facility or system in a given location and time [72].
PPE: the availability of proper personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare work-
ers in a healthcare facility or system in a given location and time [72].
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Supplemental Oxygen: the availability of supplemental oxygen to provide healthcare
services in a healthcare facility or system in a given location and time [72].
Demand for Health Services: the likelihood and intensity of demand for medical supplies
to provide healthcare services [72].
Physical infrastructure/facilities
Emergency Departments: the availability of emergency department facilities to provide
healthcare services in a healthcare system at a given location and time [73].
Intensity Care Unit (ICU) Beds: the availability of ICU beds to provide healthcare ser-
vices in a healthcare facility or system at a given location and time [73].
Mental Healthcare Departments: the availability of mental healthcare department facili-
ties to provide healthcare services in a healthcare system at a given location and time [73].
Neonatal Care: the availability of neonatal care facilities to provide healthcare services
in a healthcare system at a given location and time [73].
Non-ICU Beds: the availability of non-ICU beds to provide healthcare services in a
healthcare facility or system at a given location and time [73].
Operating Rooms: the availability of operating room facilities to provide healthcare
services in a healthcare system at a given location and time [73].
Pharmacies: the availability of pharmacy facilities to provide pharmaceuticals and medi-
cal supplies in a healthcare system at a given location and time [73].
Access (Waiting Time): the degree and likelihood of time to wait for accessing to health-
care facilities in a healthcare system at a given location and time [173].
Demand for Health Services: the likelihood and intensity of demand for physical infras-
tructure and facilities to provide healthcare services [72].
Information System
Patient Tracking & Identification: the availability of a patient level tracking and identifi-




Geographical Location (V): place where a particular point or object exists. It is often
given in terms of latitude and longitude [78]. In this case refers to the place where the
facilities of the Vendor/Supplier are located.
Labor Shortage (Supplier): likelihood of a disequilibrium in the market between supply
and demand, where the quantity of workers demanded exceeds the supply available and
willing to work at a particular wage and working conditions at a particular place and time. It
is measured as the difference between the demanded and the available workers for a given
set of conditions. [79]. This variable measures the labor shortage in the Vendor/Supplier.
Value of Product (V): worth in monetary terms of the technical, economic, service, and
social benefits a customer company receives in exchange for the price it pays for a product.
Typically measured in monetary terms per unit [74].
Type of Product: set of characteristics of offered goods and/or services. Products can be
classified according to offering, purchase frequency, and features [80]. This variable refers to
the type of product offered by the Vendor/Supplier.
Raw material availability: availability of prime materials from which a product is made.
It is expressed as the ratio of available units of materials with respect to the required units.
[25]. Shortage of raw materials is driven by institutional or structural inefficiency or by a
physical limitation or constraint, among others. Its consequences can be of technological,
geographical or operational in nature [81].
Vendor Infrastructure Damage: the likelihood of direct physical damage or loss of func-
tionality of the physical systems or networks that provide circulation of people, goods,
services and information in the supply chain. Measured as the degree of loss of functionality
of the infrastructure [82]
Vendor Closure: the likelihood of closure of system or networks of facilities of entities in
the supply chain, in this case for the Vendor/Supplier [83].
IT & Cyber Compliance (V): set of security and safety standards aimed to assess, prevent,
and mitigate IT & Cyber Risks [36]. This variable refers to the application of said standards
in the operation of the Vendor/Supplier.
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Vendor Computer Information System: availability of the system comprised by hardware
and software applications that supports the integration and coordination of Supply Chains for
effective Supply Chain Management in activities such as inventory management, production
control, and order tracking among others [84].
Scheduling Production (V): process of defining the independent demand items an or-
ganization must produce and when they are needed, providing a detailed arrangement of
the time and quantities that have to be produced or provided for various products.[41]. This
variables captures the existence and degree of implementation of the scheduling process for
the Vendor/Supplier.
Demand Planning: the process of "identifying, aggregating, and prioritizing, all sources
of demand for the integrated supply chain of a product or service at the appropriate level,
horizon and interval" [85].
Inventory Carrying Cost (V): measure of the costs incurred to hold inventory as a result
of the cost of opportunity cost, shrinkage costs, insurance and taxes, obsolescence, theft, use
of storage facilities and other causes. [85, 86].
Inventory Carrying Cost Rate (V): ratio of inventory carrying cost and total cost of
inventory, measured typically as a percentage [86].
Vendor Delay: the likelihood of a 4late or postponed shipping of goods from the Ven-
dor/Supplier to the Manufacturer, measured in time units. [93]
Vendor Capacity: measured limit or ability of physical facilities, personnel and process of
an entity in the Supply Chain to meet the customer’s needs for goods or services. It includes
the ability to produce, store, transport or transform materials or services [91], [85]
Reputation (V): set of perceptions of stakeholders or individuals about what an organiza-
tion represents and the way the firm manages its assets [36].
Action Trigger (V) (Reputation): reputation trigger, or component, related with the
company’s actions, including quality of management, treatment of employees, working
conditions, resource utilization, long term investment, corporate social responsibility, and
firm’s culture [36].
Offering Trigger (V) (Reputation): reputation trigger, or component, related with the
products and services offered, availability of products and services, branding, inventiveness,
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consumer experience, and image of brand users [36].
Manufacturer
Geographic Location (M): see Geographic Location (V) . In this case refers to the place
where the facilities of the Manufacturer are located.
Demand (M): the known quantity that will be purchased for a specific product or service
based on open production orders from the Manufacturer to the Vendor/Supplier [85], [91].
Supply Delay: likelihood of late or postponed delivery of goods/services from the Ven-
dor/Supplier to the Manufacturer, measured in time units. [93]
Supplier Clustering: "geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and
associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and complementaries"
[90]
Supply Shortage: likelihood of a scenario where the quantity demanded by the Manufac-
turer is greater than the quantity supplied by the Vendor/Supplier, according to its capacity
[93].
Lead Time: time interval between the placement of an order by the Manufacturer, and its
delivery from the Vendor/Supplier [91], [86].
Labor Shortage (M): see Labor Shortage (Supplier). This variable applies for a labor
shortage on the Manufacturer.
Value of Product (M): see Value of Product (V). This variables applies for the Value of
Product of the Manufacturer.
Type of Product (M): see Type of Product (V). This variable refers to the Type of Product
offered by the Manufacturer.
Safety Stock (M): extra stock that is held as a contingency against future variability of
supply and/or demand, such as demand rising or suppliers being unable to deliver goods
[94].
Manufacturing Disposal Practices: activities and actions oriented to waste management
including collection, transport, treatment and disposal of waste; control, monitoring and
regulation of production. It also includes the prevention of waste production through reuse
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and recycling [92].
Manufacturing Infrastructure Damage: see Vendor Infrastructure Damage. This variable
applies for the physical damage on the infrastructure of the Manufacturer.
Manufacturing Plant Closure: see Vendor Closure. Applies for the Manufacturer.
IT & Cyber Compliance (M): see IT & Cyber Compliance. This variable refers to the
application of the standards in the operation of the Manufacturer.
Manufacturer Computer Information System: see Vendor Computer Information System.
Applies for the Computer Information System that supports the Manufacturer’s Operations.
Scheduling Production (M): see Scheduling Production (V). This variable captures the
existence and degree of implementation of the scheduling process for the Manufacturer.
Demand Planning (M): see Demand Planning in previous section. This variable applies
for the Manufacturer’s demand planning.
Inventory Carrying Cost (M): see Inventory Carrying Cost (V). This variable refers to
the Inventory Carrying Cost of the Manufacturer.
Inventory Carrying Cost Rate (M): see Inventory Carrying Cost Rate (V). This variable
refers to the Inventory Carrying Cost Rate of the Manufacturer.
Reputation (M): see Reputation (V). This variable refers to the Reputation of the Manu-
facturer.
Action Trigger (M) (Reputation): see Action Trigger (V) (Reputation . This variable refers
to the Action Trigger reputation component of the Manufacturer.
Offering Trigger (M) (Reputation): see Offering Trigger (V) (Reputation. This variable
refers to the Offering Trigger reputation component of the Manufacturer.
Manufacturing Delay: analogous to Vendor Delay. The likelihood of late or postponed
shipping of finished goods from the Manufacturer to the Retailer, measured in time units [93].
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Finished Goods Supply: inventory of items that have been through the manufacturing
process, can be sold as a completed items or as repair parts, and are ready for distribution.
[85, 94].
Retailer
Geographic Location (R): see Geographic Location (V) . In this case refers to the place
where the facilities of the Retailer are located.
Labor Shortage (R): see Labor Shortage (M). This variable applies for a Labor Shortage
for the Retailer.
Demand (R): the known quantity that will be purchased for a specific product or service
based on open production orders from the Retailer to the Manufacturer [85], [91].
Supply Delay: the likelihood of late or postponed delivery of goods/services from the
Manufacturer to the Retailer, measured in time units. [93]
Centralized Production: the likelihood of concentration within a particular location
and/or group of manufacturing activities and companies that supply finished goods to the
Retailer [91].
Supply Discontinuity: analogous to Supply Shortage. The likelihood of a scenario where
the quantity demanded by the Retailer is greater than the quantity supplied by the Manufac-
turer, according to its capacity [93].
Lead Time (R): time interval between the placement of an order by the Retailer, and its
delivery from the Manufacturer [91], [86].
Type of Product (R): see Type of Product (V). This variable refers to the type of product
offered by the Retailer.
Value of Product (R): see Value of Product (V). This variables applies for the Value of
Products of the Retailer.
Safety Stock (R): see Safety Stock (M). This variable applies for the Retailer’s Safety Stock.
Retailer Infrastructure Damage: see Vendor Infrastructure Damage. This variable applies
for the physical damage in the infrastructure of the Retailer.
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Retailer Closure: see Vendor Closure. Applies for the Retailer’s facilities.
Working Conditions: "refers to the working environment and aspects of an employee’s
terms and conditions of employment. This covers such matters as: the organisation of work
and work activities; training, skills and employability; health, safety and well-being; and
working time and work-life balance" [99].
IT & Cyber Compliance (R): see IT & Cyber Compliance. This variable refers to the
application of the standards in the operation of the Retailer.
Retailer Computer Information System: see Vendor Computer Information System. Ap-
plies for the Computer Information System that supports the Retailer’s Operations.
Demand Planning: see Demand Planning (M) in previous section. This variable applies
for the Retailer’s Demand Planning.
Inventory Carrying Cost: see Inventory Carrying Cost (V). This variable refers to the
Inventory Carrying Cost of the Retailer.
Inventory Carrying Cost Rate (R): see Inventory Carrying Cost Rate (V). This variable
refers to the Inventory Carrying Cost Rate of the Retailer.
Reputation: see Reputation (V). This variable refers to the Reputation of the Retailer.
Action Trigger (R) (Reputation): see Action Trigger (V) (Reputation). This variable refers
to the Action Trigger reputation component of the Retailer.
Offering Trigger (R) (Reputation): see Offering Trigger (V) (Reputation. This variable
refers to the Offering Trigger reputation component of the Retailer.
Retailer Delay: analogous to Vendor Delay. Late or postponed shipping of goods from
the Retailer to the Customer, measured in time units. [93]
Retailer Inventory Level: stock of goods or products in a facility which are intended to
be sold in a specific period [94], [85].
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Customer
Geographic Location (C): see Geographic Location (V) . In this case refers to the place
where the Customer, or the Customer’s facilities are located.
Demand (C): the known quantity that will be purchased for a specific product or service
based on open production orders from the Customer to the Retailer [85], [91].
Lead Time (C): time interval between the placement of an order by the Customer, and its
delivery from the Retailer [91], [86].
Supply Delay: the likelihood of a late or postponed delivery of goods/services from the
Retailer to the Customer, measured in time units. [93]
Supply Discontinuity: analogous to Supply Shortage. The likelihood of a scenario where
the quantity demanded by the Customer is greater than the quantity supplied by the Retailer,
according to its capacity [93].
Logistics Operator
Logistics Personnel Shortage: see Labor Shortage (M). This variable applies for a labor
shortage on the Logistics Operator.
Transportation Restrictions/Disruptions: the likelihood that set of constraints of varying
nature, such as regulatory, economic, or environmental reduce the transportation capacity of
the Logistics Operator. [106].
Transportation Mode: method of transportation used to move goods from one point to
another [86], [85].
IT & Cyber Compliance: see IT & Cyber Compliance. This variable refers to the applica-
tion of the standards in the operation of the Logistics Operator.
Logistics Computer Information System: see Vendor Computer Information System. Ap-
plies for the Computer Information System that supports the Logistics operations.
Tracking System: set of technologies used to monitor and record the location of shipments
as they move throughout the supply chain [85]. This variable refers to the application of
tracking technologies by the Logistics Operator.
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Transportation Cost: total expenditures for the movement of freight from one point to
another [41].
Routing and Scheduling: process of determining how shipments will move across the
supply chain, including detailed information about carriers involved, routes, and estimated
time enroute [85].
Material/Product Geographical Location: see Geographical Location (V) This variables
refer to the place where the materials or products are located while being transported.
Transport Greenhouse Gases Emissions: emission of gases contributing to the greenhouse
effect, such as carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, ozone, and chloro-fluorocarbons,
resulting from transportation activities [92].
Mode Reliability: refers to the consistency of a transportation mode to meet customer
requirements in terms of pickup and delivery times of goods or materials [41].
Storage & Distribution Capacity: measured limit or ability of physical facilities, person-
nel and process of a Logistics Operator for an effective flow and storage of goods or services,
meeting the customer’s requirements [91], [85].
Mode Security: the likelihood for a shipment to be the target of piracy or theft, in relation




Carbon Budget: the magnitude and likelihood of greenhouse gas emissions from a supply
chain system at a given location and time [107].
Sustainable Development Goals
Sustainable Development: the degree and likelihood of achieving sustainable goals in-
cluding water security and waste control in a given location and time [108].
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5.3.3.2 Economic
Supply Chain performance metrics
Wage Increase: likelihood of wage increase as a consequence of labor shortage in the
entities of the Supply Chain [24].
SC Labor Cost: expenses originated from salaries attributed to the usage of direct labor
in the entities of the Supply Chain [86].
Inventory Carrying Cost: see Inventory Carrying Cost (V). This variable refers to the
total Inventory Carrying Cost in the Supply Chain.
SC Transportation Cost: see Transportation Cost. This variable refers to the total Trans-
portation Cost in the Supply Chain.
On-time delivery: the likelihood that a scheduled shipment is delivered on the expected
date, or within an allowable tolerance [86].
Invoice reduction per order: deduction in an invoice, requested by a customer, to get a
compensation for inconveniences or added costs after a service failure [41].
Lost sales/returned ratio: ratio of the customers experiencing service failure that request
the orders to be corrected to the customers that refuse the orders [41].
Order Value: total revenue by orders delivered in full [41].
Rehandling Cost: costs associated with correcting orders, such as reshipping correct
items and returning incorrect and refused items, after a service failure [41].
Service Failure: likelihood of an entity of the supply chain of failing to fulfill customer’s
orders in a satisfactorily manner [41].
Customer Satisfaction: measure of satisfaction of customers with the quality of the goods
and services offered, and delivered [85].
% or Orders delivered in full: percentage of orders that are received by the customer in
the quantities committed with respect to the total number of orders [86].
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5.3.4 States of Risk
5.3.4.1 Social
Death-related indexes
Deaths (Community): total number of deaths at the community level conditioned by
Community Health.
Deaths (Deaths (Supply Chain): total number of deaths in the Supply Chain Workforce
conditioned by the Health of the Workforce (Supply Chain) variable.
Deaths (Healthcare): total number of deaths in the Healthcare Workforce conditioned by
the Health of the Workforce (Healthcare) variable.
Mortality/Fatality: ratio of total number of deaths to total population in a time interval. It
is a measure of the frequency of occurrence of death in a defined population [112]
Infant Mortality: ratio of number of deaths among children under 1 year of age to the
total number of births reported during a specified time interval [112].
Health indexes
Recovered Cases: total number of SARS-CoV-19 recovered cases at the community level.
Life Expectancy: refers to the average number of years a person may expect to live [111].
5.3.4.2 Environmental
Climate-related metrics
Climate Change Abatement: the degree of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from
supply chain systems at a given location and time [107].
Climate Regulation: the degree of ecosystem services to store greenhouse gas emissions
due to supply chain systems activities [174].
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Sustainable Development Goals
Water and Food Provisioning: the degree of securing provision of food and water to a
population at a given location and time [114].
Natural Heritage: the degree of conservation of habitats of threatened animal and plant
species, and sites with natural value such as research significance or natural beauty [115].
5.3.4.3 Economic
Supply Chain Performance Metrics
Operational Cost: daily expenses originated by the execution of a company’s activities,
including salaries, transportation and warehousing, and inventory carrying costs. [41], [94].
Cash-to-cash Cycle Time: average elapsed time between payment to a vendor for materi-
als or services and the receipt of payment from a customer for shipments [86].
Service Failure Cost: cost associated with the inability of an entity of the supply chain to
correctly fulfill customer’s orders. These costs originate from lost sales of refused orders,
invoice deduction of rectified orders, and rehandling costs associated with correcting the
orders. [41].
Total Supply Chain Management Cost: in the context of the model, this variable rep-
resents the total implementation cost of active and passive countermeasures that mitigate
the vulnerability of the entities in the Supply Chain System. In Supply Chain Management
literature, Total Supply Chain Management Cost refers to the total costs to "manage order
processing, acquire materials,manage inventory, and manage supply-chain finance, planning,
and IT costs, as represented as a percent of revenue" [85].
Business metrics
Unemployment: refers to the percentage of workers in the labor force who do not have
currently a job [96].
Revenue: amount of income originated from sales made to customers that comes into a
business [94, 85].
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Reputation: see Reputation (V). This variable represents the economic state of Risk
derived from the Reputation of the entities in the Supply Chain.
5.4 Risk Assessment & Management Model
The Risk Assessment model is expanded to the Risk Assessment & Management model
through the inclusion of mitigating strategies. In order to do this, the following steps were
followed:
• Identify strategies oriented to reduce the threat intensity (Active countermeasures)
• Identify strategies oriented to reduce the vulnerability of the systems (Passive counter-
measures)
• Identify strategies oriented to reduce the overall impacts (Passive countermeasures)
The same 4 models described in 5.1 are presented from Figure 10 to 13, including
complete and minimum conceptual models for one, and different locations. High resolution
versions of the model can be found in the appendix.
Section 5.5 lists the variables of mitigating strategies, grouping them by Active, or
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Figure 10: Complete Risk Assessment & Management model - One location, see the appendix
A.2 for a higher resolution version
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Figure 11: Minimum Conceptual Risk Assessment & Management model - One location,
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Figure 13: Complete Risk Assessment & Management model - Multiple locations, see the appendix A.2 for a higher resolution version
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5.5 Mitigating Strategies - Variable grouping
5.5.1 Active Countermeasures
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5.6 Variable Definitions for Risk Assessment & Management Model
5.6.1 Active Countermeasures
Laws & Regulations
Law Enforcement: enforcement mechanisms to ensure an effective and efficient applica-
tion of laws and regulations [28].
Laws and Regulations: set of policies and regulations to mitigate the effect of threats on
vulnerable systems, or to reduce a state of vulnerability of a system [28].
School Regulations: set of policies and regulations aimed at mitigating the spread of
SARS-CoV-19 in educational institutions, including reduction of activities or school closures
[178].
Travel Regulations: set of policies applied to human travel within national borders and
across countries, aimed at mitigating the spread of COVID-19 [24].
Social Distancing Regulations: this variable refers to the characteristics and validity of
policies and regulations pertinent to the physical distancing in a society with the objective to
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mitigate the spread of COVID-19.
Transportation Regulations: set of policies and restrictions that apply to different modes
of transportation in order to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 [75].
COVID-19 Active Countermeasures
Personal sanitation and cleaning: cleaning and sanitation practices including washing
your hands and using hand sanitizer [195].
Surface cleaning and disinfection: the use of bleach and isopropyl alcohol (IPA) to clean
and sanitize contaminated surfaces by SARS-CoV-2 [47].
Improve/implement ventilation system: ventilation and filtration provided by heating,
ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) to reduce COVID-19 Airborne transmission [195].
Testing: COVID-19 testing mechanisms applied to a population in a given location and
time. This variable is strongly conditioned on the availability of tests, and proper facilities
for testing [185].
Quarantine: quarantine mechanisms such as self-isolation and mandatory state-managed
quarantine [182].
Contact Tracing: set of methods to identify people who have been in close contact with a
COVID-19 positive case [182].
Food & Water Treatment
Education to encourage the proper cooking of food: education mechanisms to inform
about how to proper cook certain meats that could contain diseases [52].





Essential services regulations: regulations that define the set of industries and business
activities that are typically instrumental to continue critical infrastructure viability, and in
which their workers are allowed to access their workplaces during times of community
restrictions [191].
Workplace regulations: regulations pertaining to social distancing, employee shifts, em-
ployee in-person interaction with public, feasibility of teleworking, workplace geographic
isolation, policies regarding sick leaves, priority for operations continuity, among others to
create a safe workplace for workers and clients, reducing the overall exposure to SARS-CoV-
2 [192].
Vaccination: vaccines applied to a population in a given location and time. This variable
is strongly conditioned on the availability of vaccines, and proper facilities for vaccination
[65].
Healthcare Services Management
Credentialing and regulations: credentialing and verification processes to ensure that
volunteers that intend help on providing healthcare services are trained and certified [71].
Inventory Management (Healthcare): process of ensuring availability of products through
safe and efficient control, storage, and replenishment of stock [94, 86]. This variables refer
to the management of products and materials required in Healthcare Services.
Financial contingency plan: contingency resources to acquire equipment, human re-
sources (including payroll), pharmaceuticals, and supplies that are not used on a day-to-day
basis [69].
Alternate care sites: availability of designated areas to provide immediate care such as
waiting rooms, hallways, cafeterias, offices, schools, large restaurants, hotels, etc. [69].
Emergency preparedness and response training: initial and periodic disaster training
exercises, e.g. "principles of healthcare delivery using PPE" [196].
Cybersecurity management: set of security and safety standards aimed to assess, prevent,
and mitigate IT & Cyber Risks [36]. This variable refers to the application of said standards
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in the operation of the entities of the Supply Chain and Healthcare Services systems.
Supply Chain Management
Multi-modal transportation: practice of using more than one transportation mode, such
as motor, water, and air carriers during the movement of materials or goods [91, 85].
Cybersecurity management: see Cybersecurity management in the previous section. This
is the same variable. It is included in this section, because it is also a parent node for variables
on the Supply Chain System [103].
Supply Diversification: act of increasing the flexibility and choices of sources of supply
for certain products, materials, and/or services, mitigating potential impacts on material
availability of political or geographical causes [197].
Inventory management: see Inventory Management (Healthcare). This variable refers to
Inventory Management in the Supply Chain entities.
Recycling & Disposal Management
Treatment facilities: specialized facility whose function is to change the physical, chemi-
cal, or biological characteristics of hazardous waste in order to neutralize such waste, recover
energy material resources, render the waste nonhazardous o less hazardous, or render the
waste safer to transport, store or dispose [194]. This variable refers to the use of Treatment
facilities by the entities of the Supply Chain when dealing with waste.
Collection centers: specialized facility in charge of holding hazardous materials tem-
porarily, before being treated, disposed of, or stored somewhere else [194]. This variable
refers to the use of Collection Centers by the entities of the Supply Chain when dealing with
waste.
Recycling and disposal: recycling refers to the processing and use of waste within produc-
tion and consumption processes [92]. Disposal is the discharge, deposit, dumping, spilling, or
placing of solid or hazardous waste in a facility at which the waste will remain after closure
[194]. This variable refers to the application of Recycling, and Disposal practices by the
entities in the Supply Chain.
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6 Case Studies
After the literature review and model formulation, the following case studies were used to
perform a qualitative pre-validation of the Risk Assessment & Management Model. This pre-
validation allowed for the further identification of variables and processes, and cause-effect
relationships. The resulting model is referred to as V 1.0.
6.1 Shortage of Personal Protective Equipment
In July, 2020, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator Pete Gaynor,
raised concerns over a potential shortage of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in the U.S.,
given the increase of Covid-19 cases in some areas of the country [198]. While the inventory
levels of masks, gloves, and other PPEs improved with respect to the first months of the
pandemic, a new surge of Covid-19 cases, and thus demand, put further strains on the supply
of PPEs [199]. This implies that an increase in the number of Covid-19 cases is followed by
an increase in demand, resulting in a shortage of PPE.
However, not only an increased demand causes a shortage of protective equipment. In
July 2020, large parts of China, including the city of Wuhan, declared red alerts as heavy rain
cause severe flooding. This caused a disruption for several supply chains, including PPEs.
According to Michael Einhorn, president of Dealmed (a U.S. medical supplies distributor),
the floods created another major roadblock in terms of PPE getting into the U.S., with delays
of up to three weeks [200]. In this case, it is evident that natural threats, such as floods, create
a supply disruption in terms of delay.
In order to mitigate the effects of the increased number of Covid-19 cases and disruptions
in the supply chains, FEMA put in place a Supply Chain Stabilization Task Force to address
the limited supply of critical protective and life-saving equipment [201]. Among the measures
considered by the Task Force, the increase of availability of critical resources has a promi-
nent role, through the inclusion of multi modal transportation for the improvement of the
transportation capacity of critical supplies. Within the risk framework explained previously,
this measure is categorized as a Passive Countermeasure, oriented to the reduction of the
vulnerability of the systems; in this case, the Supply Chain.
This case study is represented in the Risk Assessment & Management Model by the
following variables:
• Infected Human Cases (SARS-COV-2)
• COVID-19 Community Spread
• Health System Services
• Community Health
• Health of the Workforce (Supply Chain)
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• Health of the Workforce (Healthcare)
• Demand (in Supply Chain System)
• Supply Delay (in Supply Chain System)
• Supply Discontinuity (in Supply Chain System)
• Inland Flooding
• Natural Threats
• Vendor Infrastructure Damage
• Vendor Closure
• Multi-modal Transportation (in Supply Chain System)
• Storage & Distribution Capacity (in Supply Chain System)
6.2 Medicines supply chain disruption
China and India are major producers of active pharmaceutical ingredients (API), that are
shipped to manufacturing plants across the globe to fabricate finished products. The supply
chain was disrupted by the national lockdowns, with India manufacturing capacity falling to
20-30% due to problems with transport and shipping, as well as labor shortage. In China,
shut-down of manufacturing facilities hit the supply of medicines, causing a spill of the
disruptions over the U.S. where, in January, the Food & Drug Administration announced
the first Covid-19-related drug shortage due to an issue with the manufacturing of active
pharmaceutical ingredients [202] [203].
In addition to this, generic drugmakers faced shipment issues around April 2020, because
the cancellation of commercial flights cut the cargo capacity, preventing the shipment of the
required supplies to the U.S. from India and China [204].
This case study shows, in first place, how national lockdowns derived in the closure
of facilities, and coupled with labor shortage, resulted in a reduction of the capacity in the
supply chain entities. This capacity reduction in a geographical region (i.e. India and China)
translated into medicine shortage in a different location (i.e U.S.). Secondly, the disruptions
on the supply chain are accentuated by the travel regulations imposed as a mean to control
the outbreak.
The following variables in the Risk Assessment & Management model are represented
by this case study:
• Travel Regulations
• COVID-19 Community Spread
• Transportation Restriction/Disruption (in Supply Chain System)
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• Storage & Distribution Capacity (in Supply Chain System)
• Supply Delay (in Supply Chain System)
• Supply Discontinuity (in Supply Chain System)
• Essential Services Regulations
• Transportation Restriction
• Labor Shortage (in Supply Chain System)
• Vendor Closure
6.3 Covid-19 spread in Mink farms
On 23 and 25 April 2020 the first two Covid-19 mink outbreaks were reported at the
Netherlands in farms farms holding 12,000 and 7500 animals, respectively. The virus was
introduced by an infected farm worker in both cases [205]. Following the cases of the
Netherlands, other outbreaks were reported in Spain, Italy, The U.S., Greece, and Denmark.
According to [206] and [207], after the virus introduction by humans, it has since evolved,
and spilled back from mink farms into the community.
During the passage through mink, the virus accumulated mutations in the spike protein
gene. This is a concern because spike mutations, and their understanding, are crucial for
the development of Covid-19 treatments and vaccines. After evidence review, the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and WHO concluded that the risk for the pop-
ulation was not increased, and that a surveillance at the human-animal interface is vital in
order to track the possible mutations of the SARS-CoV-2 virus [207]. Despite this, Denmark,
Spain, and other countries have ordered the culling of the mink farm population in an attempt
to control the outbreaks, and the spillover into the communities . The reduction of mink
population worldwide has had a disruptive effect on the fur industry and its supply chain that
is reflected in a reduced availability of raw materials, in an industry that was facing scrutiny
during the previous years [208].
The described situation in this case study reveals the potential for Human-to-mink trans-
mission, the potential mutation of the virus in a new host, and finally the transmission from
mink to human in return. The case study also shows how the policies and countermeasures,
in this case the culling of mink populations, has an impact on supply chains by reducing the
availability of raw materials.
This case study is represented by the following variables from the Risk Assessment &
Management Model:
• Infected Human Cases (SARS-COV-2)
• Reservoir Host Density
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• Human Exposure Dose Due to Excretion
• Emerging Zoonotic Diseases Spillover
• Community Health
• Laws and Regulations
• Raw Material Availability (in Vendor, within Supply Chain System)
• Vendor Delay (in Vendor, within Supply Chain System)
• Vendor Capacity (in Vendor, within Supply Chain System)
• Supply Delay (in Supply Chain System)




• Deaths (Supply Chain)
• Deaths (Healthcare
6.4 Migration caused by natural threats
Migration due to environmental threats such as hurricanes has been recognized in the
literature in recent years. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) uses
the term "environmental refugees" to refer to vulnerable people who is moving because of
extreme environmental events [209].
In the month of November 2020, two category 4 hurricanes (Eta and Iota) impacted
Central American countries, and as a result, they suffered meaningful economic, social, and
environmental losses such as rivers overflowing, crops destroyed, cattle washed away, schools
flooded, and roads engulfed in landslides. It is very likely that due to the circumstances
people from Central America will tend to migrate to Mexico and U.S. [210]. Additionally,
the likelihood of getting infected of COVID-19 in a migration caravan is high due to close
contact between people.
News has also reported concerns about COVID-19 spread in emergency shelters due to
more people seeking refuge that can increases the likelihood of direct or indirect contact
with a COVID-19 case. Many people has lost their homes because of the storms, and are
looking for basic necessities such as shelter and clean drinking water [210].









• COVID-19 Community Spread.
6.5 PPE and Customer Satisfaction in Mexico
On February 27th, 2020, the first COVID-19 case in Mexico was reported [211]. Less than 3
weeks after the first case, a protest organized by Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS)
staff took place to demand medical supplies and personal protective equipment (PPE) [212].
A more recent protest was reported by infobae Mexican News on January 1st, 2021 [213].
The demands are similar to the previous protest: medical supplies, PPE, tests, and vaccines.
From this case study, several variables were identified from the Risk Assessment and
Management Model:





The disruption on the supply of PPE for the medical staff generated a dissatisfaction that
resulted on a protest. One of the inferred causes of the lack of PPE for the medical staff is
a global supply disruption where the demand surpassed the production capacity of supply
chains. However, it has been reported that there is an absence of support from the Mexican
Government to provide PPE that contributed to the shortage [212].
6.6 COVID-19 Spread, PPE, and Health Workers Deaths in Mexico
97,632 Mexican health-care workers were infected between Feb 28 and Aug 23, and the
main reason attributed to this infection was that nearly half of the workers did not have PPE
at work [212]. Additionally, a lack of proper training of the health-care workers to manage
COVID-19 patients has facilitated the spread of the disease in the medical staff [BBC2020].
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On September 3rd, 2020, Amnesty International reported that "more Mexican health-care
workers had died of COVID-19 than any other country" [212]. 1,320 Mexican health-care
workers were reported as confirmed COVID-19 deaths by Amnesty International. Diseases
such as obesity, diabetes, and hypertension, which are common between Mexican medical
doctors, further compromised the health of the staff, and contributed to the number of deaths
[212].
This case study is represented by several variables from the Risk Assessment and
Management Model:














• Health System Services.
• Health of the Workforce (Healthcare).
• Deaths (Healthcare).
• Financial Contingency Plan.
• Emergency Preparedness and Response Training.
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The last two variables are passive countermeasures that were identified when recreating
this case study in the Model. It has been hypothesized that by implementing a Financial
Contingency Plan to increase the supply of PPE for medical staff could reduce the number
of infected health-care workers, and therefore reduce the number of COVID-19 deaths
in the health-care sector. Furthermore, a proper Emergency Preparedness and Response
Training to manage the COVID-19 disease on patients could help to avoid direct contact
between infected patients and health-care workers, and consequently reducing the likelihood
of infection between health-care workers.
7 Model Validation
After the pre-validation of the model through case studies, an expert knowledge elicitation
will be carried out in order to validate the models presented in previous sections.Figure 14
shows the sequence of activities for the validation process.
Figure 14: Model validation process
7.1 Workshop #1 - Pre-elicitation presentation
The first workshop consists of a Pre-elicitation presentation where the research team will
introduce the project and its objectives, the risk assessment and management framework, and
the Bayesian Networks. The team will also explain the expected outcomes of the process,
and the workflow for Workshops #2, and #3.
7.2 Workshop #2
The Risk Assessment Management model has 5 components: Threats, Systems, Impacts,
States of Risk, and Mitigating Strategies. During this workshop, the experts will be assigned
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to different breakout rooms according to their expertise to discuss, first, the Threats com-
ponent, and later, the Systems component. The discussion on the breakout rooms will be
focused on:
• Identification of Variables and Processes
– Have the main variables/processes been captured in the model?
– Are there any variables/processes missing?
• Identification of Cause-effect relationships
– Are the cause-effect relationships correct?
– Are there any relationships missing?
• Prioritization of Variables and Processes
7.3 Workshop #3
During the last workshop, experts will be assigned once more to breakout rooms to provide
feedback on the Impacts, and States of Risk components. The discussion on the breakout
rooms will be focused on:
• Identification of Variables and Processes
• Identification of Cause-effect relationships
• Prioritization of Variables and Processes
Following that, there will be a plenary session to discuss potential Mitigating Strategies
to be included in the model. Finally, the research team will share with the participants a
series of surveys intended to gather additional feedback on:
• Sources of evidence for the variables in the model
• Comments or observations on the development of the workshops
• Additional feedback on the model
8 Conclusions
• A Risk definition where the Risk is expressed as the product of Hazard, Vulnera-
bility, and Consequences serves as the Risk Assessment Framework for the model
development.
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• In order to fulfill the objectives of the R7 and R13 projects, a Version 1.0 of a Risk
assessment Model was formulated. This model maps qualitatively the participating
processes needed to simulate ‘prognosis and diagnosis scenarios’ of social, economic
and environmental impacts posed by COVID19 on the U.S. trade supply chain in-
frastructure. The risk assessment model also address he public health impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic on the U.S. – Mexico health supply chain systems for health
infrastructure and for the health of the workforce.
• The Risk Assessment Framework is expanded to Risk Assessment & Management,
through the inclusion of Active and Passive Countermeasures. The Active Counter-
measures have an impact on hazard reduction, while the Passive Countermeasures
have an impact on the vulnerability and/or consequence reduction.
• The model formulation followed a sequence of activities, starting with the identification
of the risk components (Threats, Vulnerable Systems, and Impacts), the identification
of variables and processes defining the risk components, as well as the dependencies
between variables within and across components. The final activity was the identi-
fication of mitigating strategies (Active and Passive Countermeasures). The listed
activities were performed based on a literature review.
• After the literature review, 6 different case studies were analyzed to perform a qualita-
tive pre-validation of the Risk Assessment & Management Model. This pre-validation
allowed for the further identification of variables and processes, and cause-effect
relationships. The resulting model is referred to as V 1.0.
• After the pre-validation process, and the resulting Version 1.0 of the Risk Assessment
& Management model, a formal validation process will take place based on structured
expert knowledge elicitation. The validation process is oriented to assess the relevance
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A Bayesian Network models
A.1 Risk Assessment models
• Minimum conceptual, one location
• Minimum conceptual, different locations
• Complete model, one location
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A.2 Risk Assessment & Management models
• Minimum conceptual, one location
• Minimum conceptual, different locations
• Complete model, one location
• Complete model, different locations
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